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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose an exact image authentication scheme that can, in the best case, detect 
image tampering with the accuracy of one pixel. This method is based on constructing blocks in the image 
in such a manner that they intersect with one another in different directions. Such a technique is very 
useful to identify whether an individual image pixel has been tampered with. Moreover, the tampered 
region can be well recovered with the embedded recover data. 
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1. Introduction 
As digital technologies advance, more and more publications are produced in digital 
formats and transmitted via the Internet. Accompanying such advance, however, unauthorized 
use, illegal copying, and malicious modification of digital products have become serious 
problems. Researchers thus try to find various ways to protect digital products; solutions include 
copyright assertion, content authentication, etc. In the area of image content authentication, the 
integrity of an image is regarded very important and must therefore be realized. A common 
approach is the use of digital watermarking techniques. Digital watermarking serves many 
purposes, for example, proof of ownership, content authentication, copy control, and so on. 
Researchers have developed various image authentication techniques to detect if an 
image has experienced unauthorized modification. Some of them can only detect whether the 
image as a whole has been altered. Others may have the additional capability to detect if a 
certain part of the image has been tampered with. Liu et al. [1] studied the Zenike moment 
values which are generated from low DWT subbands. They found that the quantized values are 
robust to common processing operations but fragile to malicious attacks. Therefore, they 
embedded the watermark by quantizing the Zernike moment values, and the locations (i.e., 
blocks) suffered from malicious attacks can be identified through examining the extracted 
values. Their method has moderate robustness against JPEG compression. In Rawat and 
Raman’s scheme [2], two chaotic maps are used in order to enhance the security of the 
watermarked images. The pixels in the image are disturbed using the first chaotic map and are 
further separated into bit planes with the least significant bit used for watermark embedding. A 
binary watermark is scrambled by the second chaotic map. The watermarked images can avoid 
counterfeiting attacks. Xi’an [3] scrambled a bi-level watermark by the Arnold transform, and the 
Human Visual System is used to determine the quantization step. The scrambled watermark is 
then inserted into the low DWT coefficients. Tamper areas can then be localized by comparing 
the extracted and the original watermarks. Patra et al. [4] convert the images into the DCT 
domain and quantize the low-frequency coefficients according to the target levels determined by 
the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Their method is computationally efficient and is able to 
withstand such attacks as JPEG compression, sharpening, and brightening. Qi et al. [5] used 
two content-based watermarks to protect the images. One of them is generated by an edge 
detector for the purpose of detecting tiny changes, and the other is generated from the 
relationship between the wavelet coefficients for localizing tampered regions. Both watermarks 
are embedded into middle- and high-frequency DWT coefficients. Finally, the generated 
watermarks and extracted watermarks are compared to authenticate the image, and a malicious 
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attack is identified if error pixels are clustered together. Their method is robust against several 
image processing operations, including JPEG compression. In Wu’s work [6], the image is 
divided into blocks, and all hashes derived from the MSBs of each block are further encoded 
using an error correcting code (ECC). The parities, rather than the codewords, of the ECC are 
separated and embedded into the LSBs of each block. During authentication, the original 
hashes can be recovered if the number of tampered blocks is less than a threshold. The hash of 
a block is produced and compared with the original to identity if the block is tampered with. This 
method has fine granularity on detecting tampered regions. 
Although many techniques have been proposed for image authentication, most of them 
can only detect if an image or part of it, as a whole, is modified; very few can identify image 
tampers down to the granularity of one-pixel level. In some applications, such ability could be 
extremely essential. For example, if an image is used as a critical piece of evidence in the court 
or in a police investigation, a generalized answer as to whether the entire image or part of it is 
altered to some degree may not be acceptable by the law. To be exact, it may be mandatory 
that the image should not allow for even tiny modification ever since it was taken. Our previous 
work [7] is able to achieve such exact authentication. In this paper, we further propose an 
authentication scheme that is able not only to detect and locate image tampers with the 
accuracy of one pixel at the best case, but also to recover the tampered data. This is done by 
first constructing linear blocks in the image in such a way that they intersect with one another in 
different directions. Second, a signature is created for each block for the purpose of 
authentication. Third, the signature is embedded back into the image in order to protect each 
pixel by the four signatures and any tampered pixel can be pinpointed by examining its 
corresponding signatures. And finally, the quantized DCT coefficients are generated and 
embedded for the purpose of recovering the tamper regions. The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows. The proposed technique is described in Section 2, followed by experimental results 
in Section 3. Section 4 presents a security analysis. A comparison of detection granularity is 
shown in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 gives some concluding remarks. 
  
 
2. Proposed Technique 
2.1. Constructing the Authentication, Signature, and Recovery Blocks 
Without loss of generality, we assume that 8-bit grayscale images are dealt with. For 
other formats, the same technique applies, too. The image is first divided into equal-sized BB 
blocks, which are referred to as the authentication blocks. And then, in each authentication 
block, four sets of pixels are collected in four directions: horizontal, vertical, 45 and 45 wrap-
around diagonals. These sets of linear blocks are referred to as signature blocks. Namely, 
 
Hi = {pij | j = 0, …, B1}: horizontal blocks, i = 0, …, B1, 
Vj = {pij | i = 0, …, B1}: vertical blocks, j = 0, …, B1, 
Xm = {pij | i = 0, …, B1, j = (m+i) mod B}: –45 blocks, m = 0, …, B1, and 
Yn = {pij | i = (B+nj) mod B, j = 0, …, B1}: 45 blocks, n = 0, …, B1, 
 
where pij denotes the image pixel and mod is the modulo operation. Figure 1 depicts such a 
construction. 
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Figure 1. The authentication block and signature blocks 
 
 
After establishing the signature blocks, a signature is created for each such block and 
then embedded into the image. If the DES system is used for signature generation, 64 bits are 
required for both the input and output data. The collection of the first 6 bits of each pixel in a 
signature block is hashed first by such functions as MD5 or SHA to produce a 64-bit data. And 
then this data is encrypted using the DES system to produce a 64-bit signature, which is finally 
embedded back into the least-significant bits (LSBs) for the purpose of authentication. The 
above procedure is repeated on all signature blocks. 
By dividing an authentication block into RR blocks, totally (BR)2 recovery blocks are 
produced. Each recovery block is resized into 88 pixels, followed by the DCT operation. The 
resulting DCT coefficients are then quantized according to the JPEG quantization table [8]. 
Furthermore, the quantized DCT coefficients are scanned in the zig-zag order and the first 10 
coefficients are recorded using codes of different lengths. The encoding pattern is illustrated in 
Figure 2. For example, the first and second quantized coefficients are represented with eight 
and five bits, respectively. As a result, totally 40 bits are generated for a recovery block, and 
such coding lengths are enough for preserving the quality of the image block. The generated 
data of a recovery block are embedded into the LSBs of another recovery block in order for 
better chances of data recovery. We denote the index of a recovery block and that of its 
corresponding embedding block as aij and aoj (o = (i + s) mod (BR)), respectively. That is, a 
vertical distance between the two blocks is preserved.  
 
 
8 5 4 3 0 0 0 0
5 4 3 0 0 0 0 0
4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 
 
Figure 2. The encoding pattern 
 
 
Since there are 4B signature and (BR)2 recovery blocks, we can determine the sizes of 
the authentication and the recovery blocks, respectively, after the embedding space is 
determined. If the last two bits of each pixel are used for embedding, the sizes of the 
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authentication and the recovery blocks are 160160 (i.e., B = 160) and 1010 (i.e., R = 10), 
respectively. 
When performing authentication, the construction of the authentication blocks and 
signature blocks are repeated as before, followed by the same DES encryption process. Now, 
the results can be matched against those extracted from the LSBs in the image. The 
mismatched blocks will be recorded in the following four sets, respectively: 
 
EH = {Hi | i = i0, i1, …, ih1}: horizontal blocks, 
EV = {Vj | j = j0, j1, …, jv1}: vertical blocks, 
EX = {Xm | m = m0, m1, …, mx1}: –45 blocks, and 
EY = {Yn | n = n0, n1, …, ny1}: 45 blocks, 
 
where h, v, x, and y are the respective numbers of mismatched blocks. The basic idea of the 
algorithm is that since each pixel is protected by four signatures and the signature blocks 
intersect with one another, if a specific pixel is indeed tampered with, mismatches will occur in 
all of its four corresponding signatures. On the contrary, if some of the corresponding signatures 
are matched, it can be concluded that the pixel has not been altered. Fig. 3 illustrates the 
algorithm of tamper detection in an authentication block. Each pixel, pij (0 ≤ i, j ≤ B–1), in a block 
is checked to see if it is tampered with. This is done by examining its corresponding four 
signatures, i.e., horizontal, vertical, and two diagonal ones. If all four signatures mismatch, the 
pixel will be reported as been tampered with. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The algorithm of tamper detection 
 
 
If a mismatch is detected, the recovery is performed using a reference image. The 
construction of the reference image starts by extracting the recovery data from each recovery 
data. If all of pixels of a recovery block are authentic, the embedded recovery data are 
considered as valid. If the data extracted from the corresponding block are invalid, the recovery 
block will be constructed with its valid data using de-quantization and inverse DCT, followed by 
scaling back the block size from 88 to RR.  The reference image is obtained after all of the 
blocks are produced, and the recovery is done by replacing the tampered pixels with the 
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corresponding pixels of the reference image if the corresponding pixels are constructed by the 
valid data. 
 
 
2.2. Analysis 
 One of the main shortcomings of most other tamper detection techniques is that they 
usually create a signature for an image block, and if a mismatch occurs, the block as a whole is 
identified as being tampered with. There is no way of distinguishing which pixel (or pixels) is the 
victim. The essence of the proposed scheme lies on the fact that each pixel is protected by four 
intersecting signature blocks. Whenever one pixel is tampered with, it causes the four 
corresponding signatures to mismatch and, through the intersecting structure, the tampered 
pixel can be easily pinpointed. In other words, if less than four mismatches occur for a pixel, we 
can eliminate the possibility of tampering. This method is thus very accurate in identifying 
tampered pixels as well as their locations in the image. There are, however, some conditions in 
which this scheme will make false positive reports. Figure 4 illustrates such a situation, in which 
the black pixels represent those pixels that have been altered by attackers. The four sets of 
mismatched blocks are: EH = {Hi1, Hi2, Hi3}, EV = {Vj1, Vj2, Vj3}, EX = {Xm1, Xm2, Xm3}, and EY = 
{Yn1, Yn2, Yn3}. It is obvious that, besides the four black pixels, the system will erroneously report 
the center pixel (represented by a white pixel) as a tampered one, i.e., a false positive. 
 Actually, the number of tampered pixels (or the size of the tampered region) determines 
the number of mismatch signatures. If the former increases, the latter increases, too. There is 
no constraint on the maximum size of a tampered region; however, the shape of the region does 
affect the number of false positives in the detection. Figure 5 illustrates an example, in which the 
black pixels represent the tampered pixels. As our algorithm identifies tampered pixels by four 
intersecting signatures, the set of reported pixels will form a convex shape (the red polygon in 
the figure). As all pixels in the convex shape are reported as tampered with, the unchanged 
pixels (white pixels) are false positives. The situation gets worse if the tampered pixels spread 
randomly across the image. The result of a simulation is shown Figure 6, in which the tampered 
pixels are generated randomly across the authentication block (160160). It can be seen that 
the number of false positives increases rapidly as the number of tampered pixels increases, 
almost reaching 16,000 when the latter is only a few hundreds. Such a phenomenon verifies the 
above analysis that as the reported pixels form a convex shape, if the locations of the tampered 
pixels are randomly generated, the convex area will become very large, which results in a great 
number of false positives. Denoting the numbers of reported, tampered, and false positive pixels 
as R, T, and F, respectively, the following relationship holds: 
 
 R = T + F 
 
Therefore, when R achieves its highest (i.e., the size of the block), increasing T will certainly 
decreases F, which explains the peak in Figure 6. The same false positive effect is also 
expected in other existing block-based authentication techniques. In practice, however, as an 
attacker usually tries to alter the semantics of the image, tampered pixels tend to cluster 
together (may be in several locations). Randomly altering the pixels is meaningless and hence 
not likely to happen. 
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Figure 4. Example of a false positive Figure 5. A tampered region (black pixels) 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Number of false positives vs. number of randomly tampered pixels 
 
 
2.3. Handling Irregular Image Sizes 
 If the image size is not multiples of the size of the authentication block, something must 
be done for the extra areas. Since 64 bits are required for a signature, every 32 pixels can be 
collected to form an individual authentication block. In those areas, however, if the signature 
mismatches, it can be only concluded that one or more pixels in such a block could have been 
altered. Figure 7 shows such a situation. The granularity of identification in those areas is thus 
32 pixels. 
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Figure 7. Handling the situation in which the image size is not multiples of BB 
 
 
3. Experimental Results  
A set of 480480 grayscale images (Airplane, Baboon, Lena, and Peppers) were used 
to test the proposed algorithm: Figure 8(a) and 8(b) show the original images and the 
corresponding data embedded versions. The PSNR between the original and the embedded 
images are 44.16, 44.14, 44.15, and 44.12, respectively, which are quite acceptable. The 
parameters used are B=160, R=10, and s=(16010)2. Therefore, the sizes of the authentication 
and recovery blocks are 160160 and 1010, respectively. The distance between a recovery 
block and its corresponding embedding one is at least half of the height of the authentication 
block.  Figure 8(c) and 8(c) show the tampered images and the results of tamper detection. The 
modifications are as follows. Airplane: the number 16 is changed to 10; Baboon: a polygon is 
place on its nose; Lena: a dot is placed on her face; and Peppers: a square is placed on one of 
the peppers. As can be seen, all of the tampered pixels are correctly identified, together with 
only a few false positives, which are shown in Figure 8(e). The number on the airplane is 
correctly detected with a few false positives. The dot on Lena’s face is correctly detected without 
any false positive. The polygon is correctly detected and a convex shape is formed together with 
the false positives. Such result is identical to the previous analysis. And the square on the 
pepper is correctly detected with a few false positives. The recovered results are shown in 
Figure 8(f) and their PSNR are 43.64, 43.94, 44.15, and 44.11, respectively. We can see the 
tampered regions are well recovered. 
 
 
  
(a)
  
(b)
 
pB
Individual 
signature 
blocks 
qB 
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Figure 8: (a) original images, (b) data embedded images, (c) tampered images, (d) results of 
tamper detection, (e) false positives, and (f) recovered results of tampered images 
 
 
4. Security Analysis  
As the DES encryption system is used to generate the signatures, the proposed method 
is secure against the attack of manipulating individual image pixels. Three other attacks are the 
search, collage, and cut-and-paste attacks [9],[10], which are common for block-wise content 
authentication techniques. Because the attacked image has to maintain good visual quality, the 
size of the pasted blocks has to be very small in order for keeping the homogeneity of the block 
content. Therefore, the key requirement for these kinds of attacks to be successful is that the 
block size is small enough, usually less than or equal to 88 pixels. In the proposed method, as 
the size of the block is 160160, it clearly makes these attacks infeasible. That is, even if the 
attacker may forge an authentic image from a database containing hundreds of thousands of 
authentic images, it will certainly have poor visual quality due to block effects and incorrect 
block content. In conclusion, our method is invulnerable to these attacks.  
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5. Comparison of Detection Granularity 
The detection granularity of the proposed method is compared with those of Patra et 
al.’s [4], Qi et al.’s [5], and Wu’s [6] methods. Because the granularity of Qi et al.’s and Wu’s 
methods depends on the image size, a unified size of 256×256 pixels is used in the analysis 
here. The comparison is shown in Table 1, in which it is obvious that our method outperforms 
the others. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of the detection granularity 
The proposed Patra et al.'s Qi et al.'s Wu’s 
1×1=1 pixel 8×8=64 pixels 8×8=64 pixels 45 pixels 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have described a technique to identify tampered pixels in an image. It 
is based upon dividing the image into authentication blocks and arranging linear signature 
blocks in such a way that they intersect at every pixel. As a consequence, each pixel is 
protected by four signatures and such an arrangement makes our technique capable of, in the 
best case, pinpointing a single altered pixel. This technique preserves the perceptual similarity 
of the original and the watermarked images, and it is also secure against various possible 
attacks. Although false positives are likely to be reported if altered pixels are spread randomly 
throughout the image, an attacker seems to have no reason to randomize the alterations. 
Therefore, our method is very useful for protecting the contents of the images at the granularity 
of one pixel. Moreover, the tampered region can be well recovered with the embedded recover 
data. 
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